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ELIZABETH A. WILSON,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 890367-CA

v,
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON
Defendant/Appellant,

oooOooo
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Pursuant to Section 24(c) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, the Defendant/Appellant, David R. Wilson, submits the
following Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Respondent,
Elizabeth A. Wilson,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.

As was stated in the Appellant's

initial Statement of the Case it involves errors made by the trial
court in its award of permanent alimony; in its failure to award
the husband what was left of his premarital property; in the trial
Court's inclusion in the marital estate of gifts made specifically
to the husband only; and its award of attorney's fees to the wife.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marital History
No additional facts need be set forth by the Appellant in
connection with this Reply

Brief.

Appellant

relies on the

Statement of Facts set forth in his principle brief on pages 4-11.
In

addition

the

following

factual

statements

Respondent are erroneous and need to be corrected:

made

by

Respondent's Brief:
Page 2:

Dr. Victor Cline recommended joint custody.
(TR 473, Exhibit 15)

Page 5:

David's bus driving is not a summer job, but
rather a nine months per year job. (TR 613)
David

spent

3.5

years

preparing

for

the

ministry. (TR 53)
Page 6:

David works 3 0 hours per week driving school
buses and 19 hours per week as a chaplain. (TR
732)
David is required to work 39 hours every two
weeks as a chaplain. (TR 732)
David's earned income as a clergyman is not tax
exempt.

Rather, contributions made to his

church were tax exempt.
Page 7:

(TR 728)

There is no evidence to reflect David could
earn an extra $2,000.00 each summer.

Page 9:

(TR 863)

David's payment of $6,500.00 to Elizabeth for
her alleged interest in the Blazer was done
pursuant to Judge Rokich's Order.

(R. 257)

Appellant also objects and responds to Respondent's Statement
of the Case as including improper inferences and statements not
supported by the record.

For example, Respondent's Brief pages 8-

9 discusses David's receipt of financial assistance from his
parents by suggesting that he had at that time incurred $11,000.00
in legal fees defending the action, had paid the expenses of his

trial witnesses, and had paid Elizabeth the $6,500.00 ordered by
the Court for the Blazer. Without specific evidence as to whether
or not those sums had been paid or were still owed, the attempted
inferences are not proper to consider in connection with this
appeal.
The facts relevant to this appeal are limited to the property
possessed by the parties prior to marriage, the parties1 marital
property, their earning history and capacity, and their living
expenses. The Respondent's Statement of Facts brings in testimony
and evidence unrelated to the issues of this appeal and can only
be responded to by respectfully requesting this Court to disregard
the same.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARDED
OF ALIMONY
The trial court awarded to Mrs. Wilson the sum of $250.00 per
month permanent alimony without sufficient consideration of the
three factors required to make a proper alimony award.
One of those three factors is "the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce

a sufficient

income

for him or herself.11

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988).
Respondent claims that the findings made by the trial court are
sufficient to support the award.
The Respondent relies on the following finding made by the
trial court:
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17. The plaintiff was not employed outside the
home during the marriage. The plaintiff was
not employed outside the home at the time of
the divorce.
She obtained employment as a
receptionist prior to the ruling entered
herein. She is now earning $960.00 a month,
gross. (R. 253)
This finding only pertains to Elizabeth's employment history. What
it entirely fails to address is Elizabeth's earning capacity.

To

that end, Elizabeth is 30 years old and in good health (Tr. 7) .
She holds a bachelors degree in business administration (Tr. 8, 53)
and has completed course work toward a masters degree.

It is this

relevant information that the trial court failed to consider in
light of the low paying job she had then secured.
A second factor required to be considered and detailed in the
trial court's findings is "the financial conditions and needs of
the receiving spouse."

Id.

Again, Respondent claims the trial

court's findings with regard to this factor were adequate.

In

support, she points to Findings of Fact, 26:
26. Based on the standard of living enjoyed
by the parties during their marriage, the
incomes of the parties, the needs of the
plaintiff, and the defendant's ability to pay,
it is reasonable, just and equitable that the
defendant should be ordered to pay alimony in
the amount of $250.00 a month. Said alimony
shall
terminate
upon
the
plaintiff's
remarriage, cohabitation with a member of the
opposite sex, or death. (R. 254)
Respondent claims this finding is adequate because only those
factors "which it considers most pertinent" need to be included in
the written findings.

However, such general statements as to

needs, standards of living and abilities to earn are not adequate

4

findings. Rather, they become conclusions that provide this Court
with no specific factual data to support such general conclusions.
A specific judicial determination of the financial needs of the
parties, standards of living and earning capacities is absolutely
central to any alimony award.

Since those specific findings are

absent in this case, there is no factual basis to make the award
of alimony.
Respondent also relies on Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (Utah
App. 1989), and further argues that any deficiency in the written
finding may be supplemental by oral findings by the court.

The

Erwin case holds that "findings may be expressed orally from the
bench or contained in other documents."

Id at 849.

A footnote

then refers to URCP 52(a) which states that oral findings are those
"stated orally . . . following the close of evidence."
The "oral finding" Respondent refers to was made during the
cross-examination of David Wilson and, accordingly, not after the
close of evidence.

Even if the statements by the court were

considered a "finding" it adds little.

The court record in

question reads as follows:
MS. WOLBACH: Well, if I might, the court's
position is that the court has plenty of
information on the following issues: Custody - for sure.
THE COURT:
on that.

Yes, I have plenty of information

MS. WOLBACH: Okay. And the living expenses
of the party and their incomes.
THE COURT:

Right. (TR 737)

5

This can hardly be viewed as a finding sufficient on the issue
of the financial conditions and needs of the parties to fulfill the
trial court's obligation to make adequate and meaningful findings.
The final requirement that must be met by the trial court is
a finding on "the ability of the responding spouse to provide
support."
App. 1988).

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah
Respondent claims that in determining this ability it

is appropriate to consider the provider's award of other assets and
David's parent's ability to contribute.
Respondent's analogy that taking a second spouses income into
consideration when making an alimony award is the same as taking
the provider's parent's income into consideration is irrational.
Mr. Wilson's parent's ability to make gifts to their son is not an
appropriate consideration when determining Mr. Wilson's ability to
provide support.

They have no legal obligation to support David,

whereas a second spouse clearly has such an obligation (See Section
78-45-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953).)
Respondent also argues David was awarded property to assist
him in making his support payments. To the contrary, David's noninterest bearing lien in the marital home, the Blazer, and half of
the IRA, cannot assist him in making support payments since none
of these assets are liquid.

When these sources of "income" are

excluded, David's ability to make alimony payments as ordered is
simply non-existent.
The trial court erred in awarding Elizabeth permanent alimony.
Each party was equally educated, about equal in age, and had equal
6

abilities to earn and support themselves.

The evidence does not

support the trial court's findings and those findings fail to
satisfy the criteria necessary to justify the trial court's award
of $250.00 per month in permanent alimony to Elizabeth.

It should

be vacated.
POINT II
RESPONDENT FAILS TO SHOW WHY THE
TRIAL COURT • S INVASION OF APPELLANT» S
PREMARITAL PROPERTY WAS PROPER
In attempting to argue that the manner in which the trial
court

handled

the

pre-marital

property

issue

was

correct,

Respondent relies on the concurring opinion of Justice Zimmerman
in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988).

The majority

opinion stands for the proposition that a party should have
returned to him or her the property he or she brought into the
marriage.
Respondent does not fall into any of the exceptions to the
award of premarital property to the spouse bringing such property
into the marriage as set out in Mortensen.

At no time did

Elizabeth have control of, access to, or any interest in the
premarital accounts. Similarly, the funds always maintained their
premarital character and were never commingled.

The fact that

David spent some of the premarital property for the needs of the
family does not alone change its character.
Respondent's

argument

that

somehow

all

of

appellants

premarital property became marital property through commingling and
use is incorrect. If at the time of the marriage David had put the
7

$37,500.00 cash into a joint account of the parties and then that
money was used for family living expenses, the commingling and use
argument would have merit.

However, that did not occur.

The

$37,500.00 remained in the account that was in David's name and
funds were used from that account for family living expenses (for
which David is not seeking reimbursement) and some were transferred
by David into an IRA account in his name only.
If David were arguing for a return of all of the monies that
were used for family expenses on the grounds that that was separate
property, that argument would fail. However, he is not requesting
that.

Rather, he is only asking to be returned what was left of

his premarital property; all of which had been maintained in
separate accounts in his name only.
Elizabeth's argument amounts to a "reverse commingling claim"
and if accepted would result in a windfall to her —

the exact

result Mortensen said should not occur.
Utah law is clear that premarital property should be awarded
to the party bringing the property into the marriage.

Since

Respondent fails to point out a valid exception to this rule, the
portion of the Decree relating to the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset
Account and David's IRA should be vacated and those two assets
should be awarded to David in their entirety.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIVIDING
APPELLANTf S GIFTS AS MARITAL PROPERTY
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Just as premarital property should stay with the spouse
bringing it into the marriage, so should gifts to that spouse.
The trial court erroneously divided the gifts David received
from his parents as marital property.
David received a $20,000.00 advance on his inheritance from
his parents which he used as a down payment for the house.

(TR

713) He received a $13,000.00 gift again from his parents used to
buy a Blazer. (TR 626) Lastly, he received a $7,000.00 loan which
he put toward the purchase of the home. (TR 635-63 6)
The trial court characterized all of the gifts as marital
property

and

divided

them

in

half.

The

trial

court's

misapplication of the law should be reached by vacating the award
and remand with instructions to the trial court to release David's
lien on the marital residence to the extent of any such gifts.
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF $5,000.00 IN ATTORNEYS
FEES SHOULD BE VACATED
David has neither sufficient income nor property to satisfy
the $5,000.00 attorney's fees that the trial court ordered him to
pay.

If, as stated in Respondent's Brief, p. 3 6 the test for an

award of attorney's fees is who is most able to pay, David would
be

entitled

Appellant's

to

an

Brief

award

from

Elizabeth.

As

at p. 18, David's disposable

set

forth

in

income after

subtracting alimony, child support and child care is $584.75. (R.)
Out of this amount he must feed, cloth and shelter himself, care
for the children when they are with him and pay his own attorney's
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fees of $11,000.00 and $5,000.00 of Elizabeth's fees.
this is mathematically impossible.

Clearly,

Further, as discussed above,

Davidfs property distribution is all non-liquid and no help in
meeting an attorney's fee obligation.
Elizabeth's disposable

income is $1,602.25.

(Appellants

Brief, P. 18) Although she has the primary obligation to support
the children out of this amount she nonetheless has far more
disposable income than David. That becomes even more apparent when
the extended visitation time the children spend with David is
considered.
The fact that the trial court's award is only a part of
Elizabeth's entire fee is likewise not persuasive that the court
considered David's ability to pay.

That ability to pay is one of

the three essential criteria that must be considered before the
amount

of

any

attorney's

fee award

is considered.

By not

considering that criteria, the award is fatally defective.
The order should be vacated with both sides bear their own
fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
The entire tenor of Elizabeth's brief reflects her desire to
have this Court uphold the actions of the trial court on a most
improper basis:

that David's parents are wealthy and willing to

give David on-going financial assistance. There is no evidence in
the record to support such a conclusion.

David's parents were not

parties to the action, nor was any evidence solicited from them
relative to their willingness to assist David in the future.
10

The alimony award should be entirely vacated. The trial court
failed to made adequate, logical, specifically detailed findings
regarding (1) the financial condition and needs of Elizabeth; (2)
Elizabeth's ability to produce a sufficient income for herself; and
(3) David's ability to provide support.
What was left of David's premarital property (the Merrill
Lynch Ready Asset account and the IRA account) should be returned
to him.
David's non-interest bearing lien in the marital residence
should be increased to reflect the gifts given solely to him by his
parents.
Lastly,

David's

obligation

attorneys fees should be vacated.

to

pay

part

of

Elizabeth's

David simply does not possess

the property or income to be able to pay such an award.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of^January, 3^90.
DART, ADAKSQN & KASTZNG

Kent M. Kast^ng
*
~71
Attorneys for Defendant^Xppellant
on the Appeal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify I caused four true and correct copies of the
Appellant's Reply Brief to be hand-delivered to the following
counsel of record on the 18th day of January, 1990.
JUDITH ROMNEY WOLBACH, ESQ.
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-6222

/Kent M. Kast
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